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Abstract 
In this paper, the organizational forms of terrorism are analyzed on the basis of an 
extensive literature study. In the literature, the hierarchical form of the “old,” nation-
ally bounded terrorism of organizations like ETA, IRA or Hamas is contrasted with 
the new “network of terror” represented by Al Qaida. In fact, however, both old and 
new terrorism are characterized by a mixture of hierarchical and network-like organ-
izational features. Both old and new forms of terrorism display moreover a set of ad-
ditional features that fit neither a hierarchical nor a network model, constituting a 
distinctive form of governance. Nevertheless, organized terrorism shares many struc-
tural features with other kinds of organizations, including economic organizations. 
Zusammenfassung 
Auf der Grundlage einer ausgedehnten Literaturrecherche werden die Organisations-
formen des Terrorismus in Kategorien der Organisationssoziologie analysiert. Anders 
als in der Literatur behauptet, besteht kein scharfer organisatorischer Gegensatz zwi-
schen dem auf ein nationales Territorium bezogenen „alten“ Terrorismus von Orga-
nisationen wie ETA, IRA oder Hamas und den neuen, vor allem mit dem Namen Al 
Qaida verbundenen „Netzwerken des Terrors“. Vielmehr weisen alle verdeckt operie-
renden Terrororganisationen eine Kombination von hierarchischen und netzwerktypi-
schen Merkmalen auf. Darüber hinaus kennzeichnet den organisierten Terrorismus 
eine Reihe von Merkmalen, die weder ins hierarchische Muster passen noch allgemein 
netzwerktypisch sind. Dabei handelt es sich um einen besonderen Steuerungsmodus 
und einen besonderen Modus loser Koppelung, die beide auf einer starken ideologi-
schen Identifikation der Mitglieder mit der Organisation und ihren Zielen beruhen. 
Keines dieser Merkmale terroristischer Organisation ist einzigartig und unvergleich-
lich; sie finden sich vielmehr alle auch in anderen Organisationen bzw. Interorganisa-
tionsnetzwerken. 
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1 Introduction 
Reacting to the event of “9/11,” one of my multiple selves, the organization sociolo-
gist, was struck by the fact that the type of organization which had perpetrated this 
terrorist attack had no place whatsoever in the field of organization studies. From the 
large diversity of organizations covered in the path-breaking early texts (Etzioni 1961; 
Blau/Scott 1962; Hall 1972), organization studies have come to concentrate increas-
ingly on one specific type: economic organizations, or firms. Step by step, voluntary 
associations, hospitals, research institutes and even the agencies of public administra-
tion have disappeared from the field called organization studies and have become the 
focus of separate and independent research fields. Nevertheless, journals like “Organi-
zation Studies” still claim, by virtue of their title, to represent the field of organization 
studies at large. The process of differentiation and attendant specialization has un-
doubtedly made research more cumulative by narrowing the range of variables that 
must be taken into account in formulating theoretical generalizations. But there is 
also a price to be paid. As the segment of reality we try to generalize about becomes 
smaller, the scope for comparative analysis narrows, and hence the opportunity to 
observe the effect of variance in variables now held constant. 
Even the broadly comparative early texts, however, deal only with organizations pur-
suing legitimate goals, organizations belonging to the legal world. The neglect of clan-
destine illegal organizations might be explained by the fact that they are inaccessible to 
scientific study. True, the use of our standard data collection methods is severely re-
stricted when we deal with drug cartels, the mafia, or terrorist organizations. Even 
when it is possible to interview, for instance, imprisoned members of a terrorist or-
ganization, as Iribarren (1998) did, the information obtained may be flawed. Never-
theless, the descriptive accounts of the basic organizational features of clandestine 
illegal organizations that can be culled from the work of journalists, court transcripts, 
interrogation protocols, and governmental agency reports show a surprising degree of 
correspondence. This suggests that a less pragmatic reason may also be at play in the 
neglect of the illegal world by organization studies, i.e. the economic perspective that 
has come to dominate large parts of it.1 The emphasis on rational choice and rational 
behavior makes other properties such as legality appear to be of secondary importance 
for organizational research; after all, the behavior of mafia organizations and terrorists 
can also be interpreted in terms of rational choice. As a consequence, organizations 
that live and act in the underworld of illegality (as defined from the perspective of the 
prevailing order) will not attract special attention. At least in the eyes of organization 
                                                        
1 This is implied by Hirst (2003) who argues that economics, the “hegemonic discipline of the 
social sciences for the last fifty years” (49), by promoting the concept of the rational, interest-
maximizing agent, has focused on “transparency” and “accountability.” “This obsession with 
transparency and accountability has proved effective in devaluing the relationships that mat-
ter and that make institutions work, and useless at catching the rogues and charlatans that 
plague modern management, both public and private” (50). 
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scholars subscribing to a comparative approach, this is a deficit that may justify a 
closer look at the organizational forms of terrorism – as a first step towards including 
the major forms of illegal organizations in the purview of organization studies. 
2 The question and the data base 
At the beginning of my inquiry I simply wanted to know what the distinctive features 
of terrorist organization are. This led to the question whether core categories of or-
ganization research can be applied to the organizational forms of terrorism in the 
twentieth and beginning twenty-first century. Are we dealing with an organizational 
phenomenon sui generis, or are there similarities to other kinds of organization? While 
a pointed comparison with specific other, legal or illegal, types of organizations is be-
yond the scope of the present article, I kept an eye on possible similarities especially to 
economic organizations. However, the foremost purpose of the following analysis is 
the identification of the organizational features of terrorism. This is a modest goal if 
judged by the dominant standard of “best research practice,” which requires the – 
preferably quantitative – test of a specific hypothesis, but it is a necessary first step if 
the range of comparative organization research is to be extended to terrorist organiza-
tions. In the end, the attempt to fit a new phenomenon into the analytical framework 
of organization research may also prove theoretically fruitful. 
In the following analysis, no original data will be presented; it is based entirely on in-
formation contained in the available literature on terrorism.2 This kind of data base 
permits the researcher to make qualitative rather than quantitative statements. The 
literature on which my interpretations are based consists of more than 60 relevant 
texts on terrorism that I read fully,3 plus the extended abstracts of 165 additional texts 
contained in a bibliography on international terrorism commissioned by the Max 
Planck Institute in Cologne and compiled at Humboldt University in Berlin under the 
direction of Herfried Münkler. In this bibliography, the extended abstracts of 199 
books, book chapters, reports, journal articles, and electronic sources are presented, 
covering mainly publications that appeared since 1990. The focus of the literature 
search for the bibliography was on questions of organization in a very wide sense, 
rather than on social background factors, ideology, or psychological aspects of terror-
ism. 
                                                        
2 My first conclusions from the literature survey with respect to the organizational forms of 
terrorism have been discussed with a number of specialists, mainly but not exclusively within 
the framework of a workshop jointly chaired with Herfried Münkler in Berlin, December 11, 
2003. 
3 To avoid an excessively long list of references, I shall, however, cite only those texts that have 
proved most informative for the questions at hand.  
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As is obvious from these remarks, there exists a rich specialist literature on terrorism 
and on organizations engaging in terrorist acts, a good part of it stimulated by 9/11. 
Much of this literature is highly descriptive, focusing on particular organizations or 
groups, such as the German Red Army Fraction RAF (e.g. Straßner 2003), the Peru-
vian Sendero Luminoso (SL; e.g. McCormick 1990), the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers 
(LTTE; e.g. Gunaratna 1998), the Basque ETA (e.g. Llera/Mata/Irvin 1993), the 
Northern Irish IRA (e.g. Horgan/Taylor 1997), the Palestinian PFLP, PLO, and 
Hamas (Schröm 2002; Frisch 1991; Mishal/Sela 2000), the Lebanese Hizbollah (Ran-
storp 1994; Wege 1994), and, last but not least, Al Qaida (see especially DSSI 2001; 
Gunaratna 2002; Rothenberg 2002). A second group of publications deals with the 
“new terrorism” more generally (e.g. Laqueur 1999; Simon/Benjamin 2000; Münkler 
2003). A third, more analytical part of the literature is framed in the context of peace 
and conflict studies as a specific field of political science, and considers terrorism as a 
new form of warfare (e.g. Münkler 2001; Kaldor 2002). There is also a specialist litera-
ture on organized crime – the illegal traffic in arms, drugs, women, and immigrants. 
By and large, these literatures constitute separate fields, insulated and walled-off 
against each other, as indicated by a lack of cross-references and the scarcity of com-
parative analyses (for a notable exception see Raab/Milward 2003). None of this lit-
erature is systematically using an organization science perspective.4 This justifies the 
attempt to re-analyze the literature on terrorism for its possible contribution to or-
ganization theory, even if no new factual knowledge can be presented. 
3 From terrorist organizations to “networks of terror” 
There is an extensive discussion in the literature of how to define “terrorism,” both to 
distinguish it from other forms of militant action and from other kinds of clandestine 
organization (see for instance Münkler 1992: 142–175; Elwert/Feuchtwang/Neubert 
1999). By and large there is agreement that a terrorist act, group, or organization is 
characterized, first and foremost, by the choice of a particular strategy, i.e. to inflict 
visibly massive harm on non-combatants in order to destabilize the enemy system or 
regime. The strategy of terrorism sets it off from other forms of militant action such as 
partisan and guerilla warfare that target the persons and infrastructure of a political 
regime or occupying power. The second defining feature is the proclaimed goal of 
terrorism: Terrorists oppose, and want to change radically, the socio-political status 
quo, whether on the national, the regional, or the “global” level. This sets terrorism off 
from the different forms of organized crime (and the war economy of warlords) that 
seek profit. 
                                                        
4 An exception is Della Porta (1995: 135) who at least raises the question of what the evidence 
on the German and Italian terrorist organizations she studied might signify in terms of the so-
ciology of organizations, but she then concentrates on motivational, not structural aspects. 
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Terrorism, as roughly defined by its goal and its strategy, can be conducted in differ-
ent forms. Friedhelm Neidhardt (1982) has distinguished between individual terror-
ists, small interpersonal networks, highly integrated groups, and terrorist organiza-
tions. To account fully for the different organizational forms of terrorism, this classifi-
cation must be extended along the lines of familiar typologies of basic forms of social 
coordination, or governance in the widest sense of the term. Formulated first with 
respect to the choice between market and hierarchy (Williamson 1975), the typology 
of governance forms has subsequently been extended to include networks (Powell 
1990; Thompson et al. 1991), clans (Ouchi 1980), and associations (Streeck/Schmitter 
1985). In the study of public policy development as well as in studies of economic 
organizations, particular attention has been paid to the shift from hierarchical organi-
zations (i.e. state bureaucracies, firms) to network forms of organization (e.g. Marin/
Mayntz 1991; Axelson/Easton 1992; Hollingsworth/Schmitter/Streeck 1994). Inter-
organizational networks have thus become an important sub-field of organization 
studies. 
Hierarchy, organization, and network are crucial categories in the literature on terror-
ism, but they do not form a single analytical dimension. In a political science perspec-
tive, the core feature of networks is their non-hierarchical nature, i.e. networks are 
being opposed to hierarchies. From a sociological point of view, the difference be-
tween formal organization and network is crucial. According to classical organization 
theory, formal organizations possess a role structure distinct from their actual mem-
bership, are clearly bounded, and internally differentiated both in a horizontal (func-
tional) and a vertical direction (differential distribution of rights and duties). This 
minimal definition also covers democratic organizations such as political parties, la-
bor unions, and voluntary associations. But even in organizations where decisions are 
generated bottom-up, their execution requires a minimum of hierarchy where size 
makes it impossible to distribute tasks consensually. Hence, large formal organiza-
tions usually display at least some hierarchical features. Networks, in contrast, are 
leaderless by definition, though this does not preclude joint action. Power may be 
distributed unequally among network components (“nodes”), but there are no for-
mal, institutionalized lines of command. Though “embedded” and hence not inde-
pendent, network components enjoy autonomy in the sense that they do not take 
orders.5 
Whatever their form, most terrorist groups appear to be rather small. The German 
Red Army Fraction and the Italian Brigate Rosse were small, highly integrated and 
geographically concentrated groups (Neidhardt 1982; Straßner 2003; Della Porta 
1995). Geographically concentrated small networks seem characteristic also of US 
right-wing militias (e.g. Abanes 1996). There is also a host of small and more or less 
locally circumscribed, radical Islamic groups. Dekmejian (1995) has counted 176 Is-
                                                        
5 For a more extended discussion of the concepts of organization and network see for instance 
Nohria/Eccles (1992). 
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lamic fundamentalist groups in the Near East alone; only for some of the larger ones, 
notably Hamas, Hizbollah, Egyptian Jihad, and PLO, do we have information about 
their internal structure – information of the kind we also have for ETA, IRA, SL, and 
LTTE. These relatively large and well-structured, Islamic as well as non-Islamic 
groups are organizations in the sociological sense of the word. They have generally 
grown out of regional or national protest movements in a process of competition be-
tween smaller groups with similar goals.6 These organizations have (sometimes even 
card-carrying) “members,” are acknowledged as corporate actors, and have an inter-
nal structure that can be described by means of a traditional organization chart. 
In the literature, the “old” or traditional terrorism that seeks regime change in a na-
tional context is contrasted with the “new” terrorism. This “new” terrorism is charac-
terized, in addition to its religious rather than secular basis, by its international scope 
and its network structure (e.g. Laqueur 1999; Simon/Benjamin 2000; Hirschmann 
2000; Gunaratna 2002; Schneckener 2002). The frequently used epithet “networks of 
terror” best expresses the claim with respect to organizational form. These are no 
longer Neidhardt’s small clandestine networks: many of their “nodes” are groups 
rather than individuals, their scope is international, and they involve hundreds, if not 
thousands of individuals. Terrorist acts are no longer committed by a given nationally 
operating organization in its own territory, but result from the cooperation of many 
distinct groups spread over a wide territory, and can occur anywhere in the world. 
The new international terrorism comes in different forms that are not normally dis-
tinguished. There are, for one thing, several possibilities for a national terrorist or-
ganization to expand its activities beyond the national borders. This is what Ulrich 
Schneckener (2002: 15–18) calls international terrorism proper, distinguishing it from 
transnational terrorism. The first form of internationalization of a national organiza-
tion is to attack targets from/in other countries in order to promote the organiza-
tion’s goal; to help in the preparations, foreign bases may be set up, as the Palestinian 
PFLP has done. A second, less militant form of international expansion consists in 
building up international support networks that collect funds and provide the na-
tional organization with other resources (such as a legitimating narrative); the Sri 
Lankan LTTE has been most successful in this effort. A third type of internationaliza-
tion involves the active promotion of terrorist groups in another country; thus the 
successful Islamic fundamentalists of Iran were instrumental in the transformation of 
the Lebanese Hizbollah from a loosely structured group to an effective organization. 
                                                        
6 An interesting question, not to be pursued here, is under what conditions a protest movement 
develops into a clandestine militant organization rather than a legitimate political party, an issue 
discussed for instance by Kitschelt (2003). The transition from protest movement to terror 
organization can be gradual, contested, and remain incomplete. In addition, there are cases of 
dual organization as political party and clandestine militant organization, the best-known ex-
amples being ETA and Herri Batasuna, and IRA and Sinn Fein.  
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Distinct from this are the three main forms of transnational terrorism that no longer 
aim to change the political status quo in a given country. There are, first, cases of ad 
hoc international cooperation among several distinct terrorist groups who pursue 
different, if compatible goals. Such ad hoc cooperation has been described by Oliver 
Schröm (2002) in his study of the terrorist Carlos. Secondly, independent terrorist 
groups from different countries may form a stable network in the cooperative pursuit 
of a common goal. Theoretically at least, there is finally the possibility of a truly trans-
national terrorist organization. 
In the literature, discussions of Al Qaida and the new “networks of terror” tend to 
merge into each other. Descriptions of Al Qaida are characteristically vague with re-
spect to the organization-or-network question, which is hardly raised in a systematic 
manner. Sometimes Al Qaida is called an organization, sometimes it appears to be 
part of a much larger network. This vagueness may not simply be the consequence of 
our lack of information; though analytically the difference between “one organiza-
tion” and “a network” seems clear, in reality the boundary between a decentralized 
organization and a well-connected network may appear fluid – as for instance in the 
case of international non-governmental organizations. Available accounts indicate 
that Al Qaida started out as an organization, managing the recruitment and training 
of Arab “fighters” that flocked to the camps in Pakistan to prepare for battle against 
the Soviet invaders in Afghanistan. Meanwhile it may have become a network of 
nearly global expansion, possibly with the transformed earlier Al Qaida as the focal 
organization (or “hub”). 
Given the available information, this factual question cannot be resolved. But the or-
ganization-versus-network dichotomy itself is not the most fruitful approach for an 
analysis of the organizational forms of terrorism. A more fine-grained study of the 
different forms in which organized terrorism occurs will instead use an analytical 
framework of structural properties, with one focal dimension ranging from the end-
point of an exclusively (ideal-typical) “hierarchical” to the other extreme of a purely 
“networked” structure. While using a different terminology, this analytical dimension 
has already been central to the discussion of organizational structure that unfolded in 
the 1960s. The discussion started with a critique of the bureaucratic (or command and 
control) model of firm structure and set out to identify alternatives such as the “or-
ganic” model (Burns/Stalker 1961). With the growing incidence of multinational 
corporations and the increasing popularity of network terminology, this discussion is 
now often framed in terms of hierarchical versus network forms of organization.7 
Multinational corporations in particular are described as displaying strong elements 
of an internal network structure (see Bartlett/Goshal 1989). 
                                                        
7 This shift in analytical perspective is of interest in and of itself, reflecting – as has also hap-
pened in the theory of political governance (Mayntz 1998) – interconnected changes in reality 
and scientific perspective that cannot be elaborated upon here.  
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4 Terrorist organizations as hybrids 
In the literature, the network character of the new international terrorism is generally 
contrasted with the hierarchical structure of the better-known national terrorist or-
ganizations (Hoffmann 1999; Hirschmann 2000; Arquilla/Ronfeldt 2001; Gunaratna 
2002). But closer analysis reveals quickly that the difference between “old” and “new” 
terrorism in terms of organization is a gradual one only. All terrorist organizations, 
including Al Qaida where it is not explicitly treated as a mere assembly of separate 
terrorist groups, display features typical of centralized hierarchical organization as 
well as features of decentralized (“networked”) and possibly even democratic organi-
zation.8 The hybrid character of terrorist organization is sometimes explicitly ac-
knowledged. Horgan and Taylor for instance describe the IRA as a hybrid of “organi-
zation” and “network,” “a cellular-based, hierarchically-organized authoritarian 
structure” (Horgan/Taylor 1997: 3). This combination of cell-structure and central 
steering holds for practically all terrorist organizations whose internal structure is 
described in the literature. True, Islamist organizations are sometimes described in-
stead in terms of a ring structure, “building from an internal core outward” (DSSI 
2001: 8), and their members may call them a movement or mission (e.g. Hizbollah; 
see Kramer 1990: 132). But where structural descriptions are given, it is clear that in 
Islamist organizations, too, both hierarchical and network elements can be found. 
What does differ between individual organizations is the relative weight of properties 
belonging to one or the other of the two ideal types. 
The following structural features, characteristic of hierarchical organization, can be 
found without exception in all terrorist organizations covered in this article: 
1. They have a clearly defined leadership – e.g. the cupola (SL), army executive (IRA), 
majlis shura (Islamic Jihad), council or again majlis shura (Al Qaida). 
2. They are differentiated both vertically and functionally. All terrorist organizations 
covered (again including Al Qaida) have specialized units directly below the top 
leadership level. In some cases the main distinction is between a military and a 
support branch, in other cases various units distinguished by functions such as fi-
nances, procurement, propaganda etc. are related to the operative units in a ma-
trix-like fashion. All terrorist organizations have furthermore a clearly circum-
scribed third level of operative units, the famous cells.9 
                                                        
8 Elements of democratic procedure have, for instance, been described for ETA; see Iribarren 
(1998). 
9 In some Islamist organizations the existence of a separate hierarchy of clerics introduces a fur-
ther internal differentiation. Clerics often played an important role in the early phases of or-
ganizational development, they are present among the leaders or form a separate unit (fatwa 
committee), and they have (e.g. in Hizbollah) their own followers down to the level of local 
cells. This makes for a kind of double hierarchy familiar from the party/state apparatus divi-
sion in state socialist countries.  
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3. Vertical communication dominates. 
At the same time all terrorist organizations covered here display the following fea-
tures, generally held to be characteristic of a decentralized, network form of organiza-
tion: 
1. There is no detailed central steering of operations; the operative units, or cells, 
enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy in planning their day-to-day actions and 
in the execution of acts of terrorism, sabotage etc. 
2. The organization reacts quickly and flexibly to situational exigencies (threats as 
well as opportunities) by changing plans and the function of individual members. 
3. The organization has a relatively open and fluid boundary. New cells are continu-
ously created, and dissolve. At all levels except the top leadership, there are mem-
bers with different grades of identification with the organization: (a) activists (core 
members, professional terrorists who, in the extreme case, have no exit option), (b) 
persons identifying themselves as members, but leading at the same time a normal 
life in the legal world, and (c) persons rendering ad hoc services, often without 
knowing to whom and to what purpose. 
The contemporaneous existence of such features is sometimes considered contradic-
tory (e.g. by Rothenberg 2002) and a source of tension. However, different forms of 
governance normally coexist, at the societal and the organizational level. The different 
features of a hybrid organization can counteract each other, and in this way contain 
the negative effects following from each pure type, such as the rigidity of hierarchy 
and the centrifugal force of network structure. In the case of terrorist organizations, 
the addition of network elements to a basically hierarchical structure is held to be nec-
essary to maintain operational effectiveness in the face of constant threats of discovery 
and repression.10 This reference to the functionality of the hybrid character of terror-
ist organization is not unlike the argument advanced by Burns and Stalker (1961) in 
favor of “organic” forms of firm organization in a dynamic, uncertain environment. 
However, a combination of the two sets of features just listed does not suffice to de-
scribe what is specific to the organization of terrorism. A careful reading of the litera-
ture allows us to identify a number of additional characteristics of terrorist organiza-
tion that do not belong to the pure hierarchical model and are not basic network 
properties. These features, highlighted especially in analyses of the “new terrorism” 
(e.g. Arquilla/Ronfeldt 2001; Schneckener 2002), but equally present in case studies of 
the “old terrorism,” seem to constitute the differentia specifica of terrorist organization. 
                                                        
10 The causal connection between repression and the emergence of a hybrid organizational form 
is manifest in the case of the IRA, which shifted in the face of mounting repression from a 
quasi-military organization to the hybrid type outlined above (Horgan/Taylor 1997).  
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5 Distinctive features of terrorist organization 
The first distinctive feature of terrorist organization is a specific mode of central con-
trol. Notwithstanding the large scope for autonomous action that lower level units 
possess, their activities are effectively steered by the central leadership, not through 
specific orders, but by generally formulated goals and strategies. Where detailed or-
ders are nevertheless given, these are typically ad hoc and directed at specific persons 
(rather than incumbents of roles). 
The second distinctive feature of terrorist organization is the latency of both vertical 
and horizontal relations. Latent relations are a special form of loose coupling.11 Typi-
cally, organizational units, and especially the operative cells, are relatively isolated 
from each other. There is very little face-to-face communication between levels, and 
between units at the same level, and especially for the lowest level units, the structure 
of the organization is deliberately kept intransparent. But a latent relation is not a 
weak relation: while not manifested in regular interaction, it can be activated at any 
time in case of a specific need for action (“bei Bedarf,” Bendel/Hildebrandt 2002: 19). 
Latent relations as well as effective control through generally formulated goals and 
strategies are made possible by a third feature typical of terrorist organization, the 
strong identification of individuals with the organization and its goals. This identifica-
tion is based on ideological indoctrination and practical learning; a deeply felt reli-
gious belief may be particularly effective here. The unquestioning consensus based on 
shared beliefs is reinforced by close personal relationships grounded in ethnic or family 
ties or in a common experience, for instance in training camps. The resulting identifi-
cation with the organization and its goals assures the willing and independent enact-
ment of general directives formulated by a (normally remote) leadership, and gener-
ates the kind of “blind” trust necessary if persons are asked to act upon signals coming 
– possibly in coded form – from persons with whom they do not regularly interact. 
Neither the distinctive mode of control nor coupling through latent relations belong 
to the defining characteristics of one of the major forms of non-market governance, 
i.e. hierarchy, network, and community. Effective central control via generally formu-
lated goals and strategies is not typical of the ideal-type hierarchy, nor of an ideal-type 
network. In networks action is held to be coordinated through negotiation, while in 
hierarchies coordination is achieved by command and/or an elaborate system of for-
mal rules (Scharpf 1997: chaps. 6 and 8). Negotiation as well as commanding also 
involve manifest interaction. Communities, finally, lack central control by definition, 
and interactions tend to be manifest. 
                                                        
11 Loose coupling is generally defined as a combination of closeness (coupling) and separateness 
(looseness), which appears contradictory but is better described as dialectic, as pointed out by 
Orton and Weick (1990) in their review of the loose coupling literature. 
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Whether deliberately chosen or not, the cluster of the three distinctive features of or-
ganized terrorism seem a functional response to the exigencies of survival confronting 
it. They are the prerequisite of organizational integrity and effectiveness in the face of 
a high degree of decentralization. The special mode of loose coupling protects the 
organization from being discovered and from the disruptive effects of the loss of a 
single unit or leader. The special mode of central control protects it from endogenous 
disintegration and from ineffectiveness in spite of the considerable autonomy of its 
parts. These distinctive features are also present in national terrorist organizations 
such as Sendero Luminoso (SL), but their functional importance increases as we move 
from the national to the international level, and from the pole of a more or less decen-
tralized, yet integrated organization towards a network of independent groups and 
individuals. 
6 Conclusion: Extending organization theory to organized terrorism 
The preceding analysis could be useful to research on terrorism by overcoming the 
false dichotomy between the “old” hierarchical and the “new” network-like organiza-
tional form, furnishing scholars with a more differentiated set of analytical categories. 
Of greater interest in the present context, however, is its relevance for organization 
theory proper. 
To start with the question posed in the beginning: Can organized terrorism be de-
scribed in terms familiar from the analysis of other organizations, such as corpora-
tions, or is it a unique type of organization, incomparable with other organizations 
and therefore rightfully omitted from comparative organization theory? The preced-
ing analysis has clearly shown that major analytical dimensions of organization studies 
can in fact be applied to organized terrorism. The categories “hierarchy” and “net-
work” that play such a crucial role in the literature on terrorism are core categories of 
organization theory. Nor is the coexistence of hierarchical and network properties in 
one organization a unique feature of terrorism; it can be found, for instance, in many 
economic organizations, especially multinational corporations. Not even the distinc-
tive features of terrorist organization “beyond hierarchy and network” are unique. 
Latent relations are a frequent characteristic of clandestine organizations, a category 
that includes secret societies and all forms of organized crime.12 Even less unique to 
organized terrorism is ideologically based organizational identification. This type of 
                                                        
12 Latency supplemented by deliberate intransparency is a response to a particular external 
threat: not competition, but discovery, not only hostility, but active persecution – a conjunc-
tion that could carry considerations of the nexus between organization structure and the na-
ture of the environment beyond the familiarly discussed effects of “uncertainty” and “diver-
sity” (e.g. of market segments). 
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identification can also be found in religious sects and combat teams, and under cer-
tain conditions in political parties and even in firms. Normally, member orientation 
in economic organizations is predominantly utilitarian. An interest-based fusion of 
personal and organizational goals is possible, but – especially in large firms and under 
favourable labor market conditions – difficult to achieve, and always precarious. Here 
the internalized normative commitment to a “firm ideology” can step in. Though 
strong member identification is often merely sought in order to secure willing com-
pliance with rules and orders, it can also serve to motivate action in the pursuit of an 
internalized organizational goal, even in non-terrorist organizations. 
The most distinctive feature of terrorist organization is central control that works 
effectively on the basis of very general directives. This mode of control is the only fea-
sible one when clandestinity requires that relations remain latent, but it can be effec-
tive only under special conditions. Either the shared ideology upon which this mode 
of control rests must itself contain instructions for specific action, or the organiza-
tional goal must be defined in such a way that it can be operationalized in many dif-
ferent ways that count equally as “goal fulfilment.” The second of these alternative 
conditions is met by a terrorist organization that fights, like Al Qaida, a vaguely de-
fined enemy by inflicting massive damage on civilians. This “goal” can be served by a 
large variety of possible attacks against different kinds of targets at different locations, 
conducted with variable means, and at variable points in time.13 In contrast, even the 
most decentralized kind of multinational corporation does not operate without hard 
and fast performance criteria to measure sub-unit success. However, if the managers 
of a multinational corporation’s subsidiaries have internalized a common, nationally 
bounded corporate culture, this may “instruct” them to pursue spontaneously similar 
managerial strategies without specific directives (Harzing 1999). 
Ideologically based identification, latent relations, and effective control through gen-
erally formulated organizational goals constitute a particular mode of governance, 
found especially in the “new” transnational terrorism, but present as well in national 
terrorist organizations. This raises the question of whether this as yet nameless mode 
of governance could count as a new type to be added to the familiar typology. It is 
possible, of course, that the familiar typology is not exhaustive; it hardly covers, for 
instance, systems of distributed control like those found in the human brain, and built 
into computers. But the governance mode characteristic especially of the “new” trans-
national terrorism does not constitute another pure type of action coordination, being 
composed of elements of hierarchy (i.e. there is central control), network (semi-
autonomous parts), and community (identification). These elements, however, are 
not simply added without affecting each other; they are welded, as it were, into a dis-
tinct type of hybrid. This suggests a different avenue in the development of govern-
                                                        
13 Münkler (2003) has described the strategy of Al Qaida in similar terms, underlining the “fit” 
between Al Qaida’s network structure and the relatively free choice network “nodes” have in 
the selection of targets. 
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ance theory: not by adding further “pure” types, but by identifying types of hybrids. 
Ideal-typical governance forms are generally considered to occur rarely in social real-
ity, and if they do, prove to be unstable. Real markets cannot persist without rules 
backed by sanctions, and pure hierarchies would topple under the impact of external 
changes to which they cannot adapt. In the current debate about institutional com-
plementarity in different forms of capitalist societies, the positive effects of a combina-
tion of different structuring principles that can enhance each other or make up for 
each other’s inherent weaknesses has been argued at length (Hollingsworth/Schmitter/
Streeck 1994; Amable 2000). Along a similar line, Josh Whitford (2003) suggests that 
the most stable kind of relationship between producers and their supplier firms lies 
“in between” the extreme poles of competition and collaboration. This, then, would 
be a new task for a theory of organizational governance: to identify stable hybrid 
forms and their distinctive preconditions and effects. 
Not surprisingly given the prevalence of network forms in organized terrorism, the 
main contribution of the preceding analysis could be to the theory of interorganiza-
tional networks, where it can help to develop a framework for comparative analysis. 
In this framework, one dimension would refer to the distinction between network and 
organization. In the literature on terrorism, we have found a certain ambiguity in the 
use of the term network that is used to refer both to interorganizational networks and 
to the structure of an organization. To distinguish between an organization with an 
internal network structure and an interorganizational network may appear to be easier 
in the case of legally constituted economic organizations than it is in the field of ter-
rorism. In spite of the network characteristics they display internally, multinational 
corporations are clearly considered to be organizations (e.g. Bartlett/Goshal 1989; 
Goshal/Westney 1993), while cartels and alliances are clearly interorganizational net-
works. But in the economy, too, intermediate forms between organization and net-
work exist, for instance among the different kinds of holdings, with financial holdings 
tending more toward a network structure and managerial holdings more toward the 
bounded organization. Production chains can also be organized in different ways, 
from arms-length market relations over network forms to quasi-hierarchies (Gereffi 
1994; Henderson et al. 2002; Humphrey/Schmitz 2002). To identify different inter-
mediate forms between bounded organizations and interorganizational networks may 
thus be worthy of special attention, both in the analysis of terrorism and with regard 
to economic organizations (e.g. DiMaggio 2001). 
There are also important differences in the internal distribution of functions in inter-
organizational networks. Production networks that link different firms into a value 
production chain (type 1) must be distinguished from hub-and-spoke networks that 
arise from outsourcing (type 2). By outsourcing, large firms can establish a network in 
which they play the role of the central node (or “hub”). In this process, the creation of 
a network and the transformation of what is becoming the focal organization go hand 
in hand. National terrorist organizations, too, have built such networks around them-
selves, a particularly impressive case being the international support network of LTTE. 
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Networks created by “outsourcing” in the widest sense of the word are also increas-
ingly observed outside the economy, even including the military (Cooley 2003; Eppler 
2002). This kind of network differs from what is usually taken to be the internal struc-
ture of today’s transnational terrorism, where Al Qaida as the focal organization sup-
plies general guidance to a network of autonomous terrorist groups residing in differ-
ent parts of the world (type 3). In the case of LTTE and of an industrial network pro-
duced by outsourcing, the peripheral organizations fulfil only support functions for 
the focal organizations. In contrast, the distributed local nodes of a transnational ter-
rorist network are engaged in basically the same kind of activity, which is the core (or 
defining) activity of the network as a whole. The closest resemblance to this kind of 
network structure is probably found not in the economy, but among international 
non-governmental organizations. As for Al Qaida, for all we know it may in the 
meantime have evolved into a kind of franchise system (Bradach 1998), independent 
terrorist groups associating themselves of their own accord with Al Qaida, using it as a 
brand name and copying its terrorist strategy. Franchise systems represent a fourth 
network type, a type that is again found frequently in the economy (see Knoke 2001 
for a general discussion of business networks). 
While we can find structural counterparts at least for some types of terrorist networks 
in the economy, policy networks appear to belong to a different category altogether. 
Policy networks produce collectively binding decisions that are reached in negotia-
tions involving exchange, arguing, and threatening. Policy networks are negotiating 
systems that coordinate preferences, while both terrorist networks and industrial net-
works are production systems that coordinate concrete actions. Within terrorist net-
works, coordination is typically not by negotiation. While the coordination of firms in 
a production chain, or in an industrial alliance for purposes of R&D, does involve a 
certain amount of negotiation, cartels seem to be the only type of corporate network 
that can be called a negotiating system rather than a production system. A compre-
hensive framework for the comparative study of interorganizational networks would 
have to cover, and be able to distinguish systematically between, these different types 
of networks to which technical infrastructure networks might have to be added. This 
framework would have to distinguish between different patterns in the internal distri-
bution of functions, as well as between different modes of network coordination, two 
dimensions that are all too easily lumped together where networks are generally per-
ceived as negotiating systems. To date, the literature dealing with different types of 
networks is highly segmented along disciplinary lines, ignoring important dimensions 
of variance. Here, then, is another challenge for future comparative work. 
In sum, reflections on the organizational forms of terrorisms can not only direct the 
attention of organization scientists to a sector gravely neglected so far, but raise ques-
tions that would, if pursued, stimulate organization theory to become – again – more 
inclusive, and more comparative. 
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